For the 16th straight summer, I invested time researching each NFL team to serve as the foundation for my handicapping in the fall and winter. What initially began as basic notetaking on some fundamental details for each team has become an arduous and detailed process for each team that derives from the reading and studying of multiple sources. Each NFL team now takes about two hours of preparation time as I add sources to my foundational work. To help document this work while crystallizing my thoughts for each team, I am providing a summary of each team highlighted by a critical question that will go a long way in their success or failure. Here is the NFC.ARIZONA CARDINALS: I thought there was reason for optimism for the Cardinals last year in the third season under head coach Jonathan Gannon and general manager Monti Ossenfort. After only winning four games in each of the last two seasons, they doubled that win total last year with an 8-9 mark. The defense took a big step forward from perhaps the worst unit in the league to the middle of the pack. But they were devastated by injuries. The 179.8 adjusted games lost to injury last season was the second most ever in the 25 years since that metric began being calculated. The defensive secondary was particularly hit hard with 51.7 adjusted games lost to injury. The results were rough: Arizona surrendered 35.2 Points-Per-Game in their final nine games — and they gave up 37 or more points in six of those last nine games. I had nice things to say about head coach Jonathan Gannon and defensive coordinator Nick Callis in my deep dive on this team last year — but those ugly numbers make it hard for me to continue those sentiments, even after the injuries. The Cardinals lost 14 of their last 15 games of the season, including their final nine games. After they lost five of their final seven games the prior year, the case for retaining Gannon was hard — and he was let go. And after failing to find any suitor for quarterback Kyler Murray, Ossenfort resorted to simply cutting his losses and releasing him. In my deep dive on this team last year, I considered that move all but inevitable after injuries took away his once elite mobility. My conclusion on Arizona last year read: “If this team does not take a step forward this year, then moving on from Murray and his expensive contract will certainly become an option worth considering in the offseason.” A 3-14 record certainly qualifies as not “a step forward” — so I am fine with cutting bait on Murray. But that was perhaps the last decision Ossenfort made that I did not find highly questionable in the offseason. It starts with his hiring of Mike LaFleur as head coach. Nepotism projects immediately raise red flags for me. While Jim and John Harbaugh are both deservedly quite successful, they are the rare exception to the rule that no more than one quality NFL coach comes from each family. While big brother Matt has his own trials right now in Green Bay as the head coach of the Packers, baby brother has been propped up for years as a professional wingman. He originally was able to use his brother’s connections to Kyle Shanahan to work as his assistant. After serving in his tenure as the offensive coordinator for the Atlanta Falcons, he moved with him to San Francisco when Shanahan was named the head coach for the 49ers. After being the Niners passing game coordinator from 2017-2024, he got promoted to be the offensive coordinator for the New York Jets when Robert Saleh left running the San Francisco defense to become their head coach. You remember the prolific offenses he oversaw with Zach Wilson under center, right? After that nightmare ended, he found himself a soft landing place in Los Angeles when another crony of his brother, Sean McVay, hired him as the Rams’ offensive coordinator. Of course, since McVay designs the offense and calls the plays, it’s unclear what LaFleur’s responsibilities really were. But he sat at McVay’s lunch table — and has had experience sitting at Shanahan’s lunch table. In the current NFL, when you are one of the least appealing of ten job openings, that is considered a relatively good resume. LaFleur immediately demonstrated that he learned the importance of CYA in his various apprenticeships; he not only retained Rallis as defensive coordinator, but he then hired professional punching bag Nathaniel Hackett as his offensive coordinator. The fall guys are already in place — an essential component for nepotism to flourish. But the even bigger problem has become Ossenfort, who seems to clearly understand that he needed to make decisions to save his job in 2026, since owner Michael Bidwell’s patience will next be lost on him after Gannon and Murray have been exiled. Like quality head coaches, good quarterbacks do not grow on trees. Ossenfort decided to rely on journeyman Jacoby Brissett to lead the quarterback room. On paper, the 33-year-old veteran ranked 14th in the NFL by passing for 3366 yards. In practice, too much of his nice stats (along with wide receiver Michael Wilson) came from empty calorie numbers accumulated in their blowout losses in the second half of the season. Seven of Brissett’s 23 touchdown passes came in the fourth quarter when trailing by double digits, when it was prime stat padding time. Ossenfort then signed Gardner Minshew in free agency as if having two top 40 quarterbacks can somehow create one top 20 QB. Yet the person most likely to be the team’s starting quarterback by Halloween is Carson Beck, who Ossenfort drafted in the third round of the draft. While once a potential first-round draft pick, two straight 12-interception seasons along with elbow surgery in December of 2024 that dramatically impacted his arm strength changed that. While his Miami (FL) Hurricanes reached the national championship game, it was on the strength of their defense and offensive line. Beck was rarely dynamic in their passing attack and looked shaky when facing pressure in the pocket. But even after all this, there is a way to punt on finding the next franchise quarterback while trying to stay competitive as the foundation of the future is built. It does not include wasting a third-round draft pick on a spent QB prospect. And it is not taking the bait on the next shiny object at running back with the third pick in the NFL draft. While it was edgy and contrarian for Ossenfort to ignore the analytics guys who scoff at drafting running backs that high when he selected Jeremiah Love when only two players were off the board, one could go only look all the way back to … 2025 and running back Ashton Jeanty rookie season with the Las Vegas Raiders regarding how well supposed once in a generation running backs perform behind dog shit offensive lines. Even if Love meets his sky-high expectations right away, the problem is that the Cardinals have already wasted his rookie year given the QB situation. It creates a vicious cycle when, by the time they finally find and develop their next franchise quarterback, in the best-case scenario, Love will be on his second contract and, most likely, on the decline. Drafting running backs so high is not an indictment of the player in question as much as the opportunity costs. The Cardinals could have drafted the top offensive linemen or the second-best defensive player of the class with reasonable expectations of a ten-year career at a very high level. Ironically — and even worse, Ossenfort then made the moves at running back that are the typical Plan B fallback options that the analytics folks use to defend that the replacement-level players for the wasted first-round draft pick will be more than sufficient! Tyler Allgeier was signed as a free agent from Atlanta. Veteran James Conner’s contract was reworked after injuries derailed him last season. Bam Knight was re-signed. Former third-round draft pick Tre Benson is still around as he enters his third season. What exactly is the plan here? Would a running room of Allgeier, Conner, Benson, and Knight — along with their preferred offensive lineman between Spencer Fano and Francis Mauigoa — have been the much preferable plan moving forward with Brissett as the placeholder quarterback? This speaks to the continued questionable decision-making of Ossenfort. In his fourth season, he has yet to draft even one player who was able to make the watered-down Pro Bowl. It is hard to blame him for wide receiver Marvin Harrison’s disappointing two years since almost everyone thought he was a can’t-miss prospect. But too many of his other high draft picks are fading. First-round draft pick Darius Robinson has had a rocky start in his first two seasons at defensive end. Ossenfort’s second-round draft pick in 2024, cornerback Max Melton, got benched last year. Last year’s top two picks, defensive tackle Walter Nolen III and cornerback Will Johnson, have incomplete grades after injury-riddled rookie seasons. Ossenfort has not found hidden gems on Day Three of the draft. In bringing back free agents in likely starting roles, nose tackle Roy Lopez and right tackle Elijah Wilkinson, after they left for other teams last season, it is not difficult to conclude the roster is regressing under his guidance. The Cardinals have a 15-36 record in his tenure. The franchise’s last winning season was in 2021. Given the quarterback room, the luxury pick reach at running back, and the recent drafting history, it is hard to be optimistic about the direction of this team.ATLANTA FALCONS: It is now eight straight losing seasons for the Falcons — and I continue to find an incoherence regarding the vision of this franchise. I don’t have a significant quarrel with any one individual decision. Still, I find the internal logic of many of the decisions in conflict with the internal logic of other decisions. I would not have paid Kirk Cousins another big contract at 36 years old, coming off an Achilles injury two years ago — but I understand the logic, so whatever. But then drafting Michael Penix with the eighth pick in the draft that year seemed too clever by half. I listened intently to those defending these simultaneous moves as brilliant, something about options and getting the best of both worlds. I just saw $100 million of guaranteed money wasted on a backup quarterback in a world where Penix was the starter or a wasted first-round pick in the limelight of Cousins' career if he was a starter. Two years later, some verdicts are in. Atlanta missed the playoffs both years with an 8-9 record. General manager Terry Fontenot was fired after five seasons after pulling the trigger on the Cousins/Penix pairing. Raheem Morris was also fired after just two seasons as their head coach — and this is another perplexing situation. I was fine with hiring Morris as their head coach two years ago — but if the powers that be are so high on him, then why let him leave the building in 2021 when he was the defensive coordinator before serving as the interim head coach when Dan Quinn was fired? Instead, bringing on the offensive coordinator of the juggernaut scoring attack that was the Tennessee Titans, Arthur Smith (and perhaps not coincidentally, son of the FedEx founder), was deemed the wiser course of action. Now, after a 16-18 record amidst injuries to both prized quarterbacks, two years was long enough to form a final verdict on Morris? I don’t love the decision to fire Morris, especially as the team was still playing hard for him with five victories in their final seven games, but whatever. I’m fine with bringing in Kevin Stefanski as their next head coach. He is a two-time NFL Coach of the Year award winner. That said, his Cleveland Browns have gone 8-26 in the last two seasons. I do have a problem with the hiring and anointing of Matt Ryan as the new President of Football, whatever that means. It remains unclear how far in scope his responsibilities entail. What are his qualifications for this position? He was the one taking snaps under center as Atlanta was blowing a 28-3 late in the third quarter to New England in the 2017 Super Bowl? He did a good job on TV for CBS? Hiring guys from television into executive positions is my white whale. I will never cease chasing how ill-advised this tactic is. Ryan’s primary qualification for this new position was that he has the trust of owner Arthur Blank. It’s his man in the building — and he represents the rot and dysfunction of the decision-making process of this organization. At 83 years old, Smith wants to win a Super Bowl — but his vanity leads him to conclude that this means he should meddle more in the football side of the business. He wanted both Cousins and Penix because he was sick of answering the question at parties regarding why Desmond Ridder or Marcus Mariota were not the answers at quarterback. He wanted Smith as his head coach because billionaire families understand each other. He then wanted Morris because he had buyer's remorse over letting him leave the building. He then fired Morris because 16 victories in two seasons was not quick enough of a rebuild — and there was the shiny new object in Stefanski suddenly available. How many years will he get? Cousins was re-signed, so his contract is finally off the books. I like the signing of Tua Tagovailoa because he comes in cheap at $1.3 million on a one-year contract. A veteran backup who is also a southpaw is smart — and he can serve as a reliable option if and when Penix is not healthy. My biggest criticism of Tagovailoa is that I don’t think he can be a viable long-term starting QB in this league. But as a cheap backup QB2? Sweet. The jury is out on Penix — and it is not looking great after he endured his fifth season-ending injury and fourth torn ACL in his career. He has only played in 14 games in his first two NFL seasons. After completing just 58.1% of his passes in his rookie season, he only completed 60.1% of his passes last season. Clock management remains an issue. The Falcons went 3-6 in his nine starts last year. If there is a problem with having two lefties at QB1 and QB2, it is that former Kansas City Chiefs right tackle Jawaan Taylor was signed as a free agent to defend their blind side after the surprise retirement of Kaleb McGary. Tight end Kyle Pitts finally began to demonstrate his vast potential when he was moved to the slot position in the second half of the season — that was the position from which he thrived in college at Florida. But will Stefanski and offensive coordinator Tommy Rees keep him in that spot? The team drafted slot receiver Zachariah Branch from Georgia in the third round. He was one of just six draft picks (tied for the second fewest in the league) the franchise had in April after aggressively moving picks with the win-now urgency of the previous regime as Blank still clings to his mortal coil. The 2026 first round draft pick was dealt last year to trade up to grab pass rusher James Pearce, Jr. While he had a good rookie season, his sophomore season is now in jeopardy amidst his legal troubles around felony charges. The defense is replacing several veteran starters from last year as well. Maybe Stefanski’s commitment to a running game — and bringing in offensive line coaching guru Bill Callahan — helps running back Bijan Robinson dominate? But the running back room is worse after Tyler Allgeier moved on as a free agent — and while they signed Brian Robinson in free agency, Washington traded him to San Francisco last year because he had already lost a step. From my vantage point, I see the consequences of a lack of a cohesive vision now tearing this franchise apart. CAROLINA PANTHERS: Unquestionably, the Panthers improved last season. Not only did they win their first NFC South title since 2017, but they gave the Los Angeles Rams a genuine scare in their 34-31 loss in the wildcard round of the NFL playoffs. Yet the question remains: can head coach Dave Canales continue to oversee the growth of this team — or were last season’s results about the best to expect from this group? Quarterback Bryce Young was certainly better as he continued to lean on the things he started doing better in the second half of the 2024-25 season, when an injury to Andy Dalton got him on the field again after he was benched after two games. He only took 27 sacks last season — and he dropped his adjusted sack rate from 7.5% to 6.1% last year. He leaned on his mobility to elude pressure — and he averaged 4.0 Yards-Per-Carry. His turnover-worthy play rate was low, and he only threw 11 interceptions. He passed for 3011 yards. But questions remain. He still did not even average 200 passing Yards-Per-Game. He’s still only 5’10. He is doing a nice job of avoiding risk and negative plays — but these are the qualities of a capable backup quarterback. What is his ceiling at the position? Management picked up his option on the fifth year of his rookie deal — but are they just chasing good money after bad? Let’s remember that this was an offense that ranked only 27th in the NFL by generating 295.6 total YPG and 18.3 PPG. On the other side of the ball, after ranking last in the league by giving up 31.4 PPG and 404.5 total YPG, the Panthers held their opponents to 327.2 total YPG, which resulted in just 22.4 PPG, ranking 16th and 15th in the NFL, respectively. Holding your opponents to -75.3 fewer YPG and -9.0 PPG is a significant achievement! But like with Young, rising to mediocrity is not a prophecy of future greatness. Many underlying numbers are troubling. After allowing the most Points per Drive two years ago, they only improved to 24th in that category last season. After ranking last in Expected Points Added (EPA) per Play Allowed two years ago, they ranked 23rd in that metric last year. The Panthers got outscored by -4.1 net PPG — and they got outgained by -33.6 net YPG. They benefited from a 7-4 record in games decided by one possession. Their Pythagorean record projected only 6.5 wins. According to the metrics by the Football Outsiders (now at FTN), Carolina had the 10th worst DVOA for a team that ever made the NFL playoffs. And I have significant questions about both game-day coaching and player evaluation. Third-year general manager Dan Morgan’s drafting decisions deserve scrutiny. Besides the questions about taking Young with the first pick in that draft, second-round draft pick Jonathan Mingo at wide receiver is already gone — and Xavier Legette looks like another bust at the position despite being their first-round pick the following year. Tetairoa McMillan won Offensive Rookie of the Year last season — and last year’s second-round pick, Nic Scourton at edge linebacker, looks promising. But it’s pretty thin after that — and Morgan is not finding diamonds in the rough on Day Three of the draft. On defense, defensive coordinator Ejiro Evero’s group allowed their opponents to convert on 47.1% of their third down attempts, ranking 31st in that category after ranking last in the league the previous year. On offense, after ranking 26th in third down conversion rate two years ago, their 36.1% success rate last year saw them drop to 27th in that category. Even more dramatic, after ranking ninth in red zone efficiency in 2024-25, they plummeted to 24th in that metric last season. To Canales and Morgan’s credit, they both made some changes in the offseason to address some glaring shortcomings. Canales has given up the play-calling to offensive coordinator Brad Izik in a move I almost universally think is a positive step. A head coach already has enough responsibilities. Do those things right — and delegate the precious play-calling to someone else (rarely is the head coach as good a play-caller as he imagines himself to be). Morgan invested significant resources on the offensive line, despite ranking eighth in Adjusted Line Yards. ESPN graded their run blocking win rate as 28th in the league — and they also graded their pass blocking as 23rd in the league. Young death with the seventh-worst pressure rate. Given the major knee injury to left tackle Ikem Ekwonu in the playoffs, this was a major area of need. The Panthers signed New Orleans free agent Luke Fortner and then drafted Sam Hecht in the fifth round to compete with him at center. Morgan also signed tackles Rasheed Walker from Green Bay and Stone Forsyth from Las Vegas and then drafted Monroe Freeling from Georgia in the first round of the NFL draft. The Carolina defense ranked last in the league with a pressure rate of 26.2% — and their 30 sacks were the third fewest in the NFL. Carolina added Jacksonville All-Pro linebacker Devin Lloyd and Philadelphia linebacker Jean Phillips to bolster the pass rush — and then drafted Texas Tech’s Lee Hunter in the second round to add depth in the middle of their defensive line. Mike Jackson and Jaycee Horn are one of the best cornerback duos in the league — so solving the pass rush problem could be what it takes to put this defense in the upper echelon. But can the offense say the same with Young under center? At least the Panthers are active in trying to put him into a position to succeed. Ultimately, however, the on-the-field gains made by this team may simply have been more a result of getting to play three weak opponents in the NFC South. CHICAGO BEARS: The Bears are a tricky team to assess. On the one hand, the impact of head coach Ben Johnson on the offense cannot be denied. According to the DVOA metrics by the Football Outsiders (now at FTN), their improvement in offensive efficiency last season ranked in the top 25 since 1977 for all NFL teams that did not see a change in quarterback from the previous season. It all started with their rushing attack. After their bye week in Week Five, they ranked last in the league in Rushing DVOA. From Week Six to the end of the regular season, they led the NFL with a Rushing Explosive Rate by gaining at least ten yards on 13.6% of their rushing attempts and also led the league with a Success Rate of 50.1%. The biggest reason for this improvement was due to the players being more comfortable executing Johnson’s vision of the offense. After the bye week, Johnson felt comfortable increasing his use of pre-snap motion from 44% of their offensive plays to 68% of their plays from Week Six to the end of the regular season. Not coincidentally, the Chicago offense led the NFL with 3.14 rushing yards before contact and 1.9 second-level rushing yards per attempt. The eye test suggests that Caleb Williams continued to improve under Johnson’s guidance. He posted an Explosive Play Rate of 6.4% when taking snaps under center. Williams should continue to grow this season as he finally gets to benefit from playing under the same offensive system for the first time in his NFL career. But not everything is rosy. Williams only completed 58.1% of his passes — and that mark was -6.9% below his expected completion percentage based on what the average NFL quarterback completes from similar throws, the worst for all qualifying QBs. His footwork remains a work in progress. Despite only tossing seven interceptions, he committed 19 turnover-worthy plays. At its best, the potential of this offense was best demonstrated in the miracle Williams fourth-down, 28-yard touchdown pass in their fourth quarter comeback victory against Green Bay in the wildcard round of the playoffs, as it symbolized the merger of Williams’ unique athleticism with Johnson’s outstanding play design and play-calling. But why were so many fourth quarter comebacks necessary? The Bears won a whopping seven games that resulted from a come-from-behind victory in the final two minutes of the fourth quarter. But the Packers were the only team that had a winning record in those seven comeback victories. In fact, despite making the playoffs with an 11-6 record, they only outscored their opponents by +1.5 Points-Per-Game and outgained them by just +7.8 Yards-Per-Game. Chicago benefited from a +22 net turnover margin, which led the league. But expecting something like that to happen again is Fool’s Gold. They led the league with 33 takeaways — and they often bailed themselves out with 13 of those turnovers taking place on third or fourth down. Of the 14 fumbles committed by their opponents, the Bears defense was able to recover 10 of those balls — and that 71% recovery rate is destined to drop closer to 50% over time. Chicago also had unusual success with interceptions. The NFL average for passes defended translating into an interception is around 20% — yet the Bears led the league by registering an interception on 32.4% of their passes defended. In all, they went 9-0 last season when they forced more than one turnover — but they had a 3-7 record otherwise. Those turnover numbers are simply not sustainable — but management treated this unit as if they expect more of the same this season. General manager Ryan Poles added speed to the defense in the offseason — but he did little to improve their pass rush or run defense. Chicago ranked 22nd in the NFL in sacks — and they ranked in the bottom-10 in the league in pressure rate. They ranked 27th in the league by giving up 134.5 rushing Yards-Per-Game — and they ranked 20th in Adjusted Line Yards Allowed. The Bears had the fifth-worst Rushing Explosive Allowed Rate. They were last in the NFL in rushing yards allowed before contact — and they allowed the ninth most Rushing Yards after contact. The starting defensive line remains the same — and they are replacing linebacker Tremaine Edmunds with free agent signing Devin Bush, whose strength is his speed in pass coverage. Granted, their poor run defense often led to them overplaying against potential rushes — and they would too often get burned by play-action passes. They also ranked last in the NFL by allowing explosive plays of at least 20 yards in the passing game in 11.4% of their opponent’s drop backs. They are tied for last in the NFL by surrendering 20 touchdowns in the air of at least 20 yards. Chicago lost 3472 snaps in the secondary from last season, with the team moving on from Kevin Byard III, JaQuan Brisker, C.J. Garder-Johnson, and Nashon Wright. Before jumping to the conclusion that change can only help with that group, keep in mind that they seem to be turning back to relying on Tyrique Stevenson as one of their starting cornerbacks despite his being a healthy scratch late in the season, with defensive coordinator Dennis Allen preferring the cornerback trio of Jaylon Johnson along with Gardner-Johnson and Wright. Replacing the veteran presence of free safety Byard III will be easier said than done. The hope is that Seattle free agent Coby Bryant and first-round draft pick Dillon Thieneman will upgrade the play at safety. And then there is Ben Johnson, who I think many are too quick to anoint as a top-level head coach already in the league. I still see a young head coach who remains too reckless in fourth-down aggressiveness. He overrates his play-calling ability. In gotta have it moments, not only does he think plays rather than players; even worse, he thinks gimmick plays. He’s flashy — and not only are gimmicks inherently unreliable, but they expose a reckless side to his game management at the expense of the best interests of the team. I will never forget his final game as the offensive coordinator for Detroit when he dialed up the play asking wide receiver Jameson Williams to throw a surprise pass in the fourth quarter in their playoff loss against Washington. The near-inevitable interception that Williams threw demonstrated terrible judgment by Johnson and a concerning predilection to rely on his genius play-calls to find success rather than putting his players in the best position to succeed. Detroit might have won that game if Jared Goff executed that play and generated points on that drive to keep the Lions within two scoring possessions. Despite his reputation, Chicago only successfully executed on 15 of their 29 fourth-down attempts last season — and that 51.7% success rate ranked just 21st in the league. Don’t forget that those 48.3% failed fourth downs often came at the expense of either sacrificing a likely made field goal or surrendering good field position to their opposition. Another systemic concern for the Johnson offense is that while the “Cardiac Bears” scored 77 points in the fourth quarter or overtime in their final five games last season, they only scored 47 points in the first three quarters of those three regular season games and then two games in the postseason. The supposed offensive genius was not outwitting his opponent’s defensive brain trust in pre-game preparation and planning. This concern is similar to a potential canary in the coal mine regarding the Detroit Lions' success in slowing down the Chicago offense last season. In losing both games against the Lions last season, the Bears scored only 21 and 16 points — and they generated only 304.5 total YPG in those two contests while never gaining more than 339 yards in either game. Dan Campbell and the Detroit coaching staff knew Johnson the best. Does their success against him suggest that Johnson’s schtick can be figured out? And does that explain why the Bears offense struggled before the fourth quarter in their final five games last season? DETROIT LIONS: After two straight playoff berths and NFC North titles, the Lions took a step back last season by missing the playoffs with a 9-8 record, which technically left them in last place in the division after considering the tiebreakers. This is now a team in transition — and the question has to be asked if this franchise missed their window of opportunity to reach the Super Bowl for the first time. The offensive line will have two new starters after the team moved from left tackle Taylor Decker and center Graham Glasgow. Moving All-Pro right tackle Penei Sewell to left tackle should be seamless. Detroit drafted Clemson right tackle Blake Miller in the first round and then signed Carolina’s breakout starting center Cade Mays in free agency. The other two will be filled by recent draft picks. Right guard Tate Ratledge is in his second season after getting drafted in the second round out of Georgia. Left guard Christian Mahogany is in his third season after he was drafted in the sixth round from Boston College. Both players started last season — but there are some red flags with that pair after quarterback Jared Goff got sacked 38 times. The Lions’ offensive line was ranked 31st in the league in ESPN’S Pass-Block ratings. The run blocking was not elite either, as they had the 11th highest Run Stuff Rate allowed — and they ranked only 24th in Success Rate with Power Rushing Attempts. When Detroit played San Francisco in the NFC Championship Game two years ago, they may have boasted the best offensive line in football. That is no longer the case. After trading David Montgomery in the offseason, running back Jahmyr Gibbs will be asked to be the bell-cow back for the first time in his career. While uber-talented, his taking 55% of the carries last season was a career-high. The Lions signed Isiah Pacheco in the offseason — but he may already be on the downside of his career after battling several injuries. The biggest concern is their secondary, which is an absolute mess. Maybe by December, things will be settled — but right now, both starting safeties are uncertain to return as they recover from significant injuries. Free safety Brian Branch may be able to return midseason from the Achilles injury he suffered in December. Strong safety Kerby Joseph has an ongoing knee issue that currently has his status up in the air. When healthy, that safety duo is the strength of the unit. Former first-round pick Terrion Arnold was abruptly released on June 29th after the starting cornerback was involved in kidnapping charges. D.J. Reed is solid at one of the cornerback spots — but questions remain regarding who out of a group of journeymen retreads or perennially injured projects. The Lions were last in the NFL last season in adjusted games lost to injury on defense. And this touches on one of my consistent criticisms of general manager Brad Holmes. The conventional wisdom is that he has been a brilliant architect of this roster — and he certainly has some good draft picks and deserves credit for the bravery to trade Matthew Stafford for Jared Goff and draft capital. But he cannot help himself from falling in love with players in the early rounds of the NFL draft and then trading draft capital to move up in the draft to snag him. He did it twice in last April’s draft. To move up six spots to target Michigan defensive end Derrick Moore in the second round, he gave away the 50th pick in the draft and a fourth-round pick. To move up 13 slots in the fifth round to take wide receiver Kendrick Law with the 168th pick, Holmes gave away their 181st and the 213th picks for a player that will likely contribute only on special teams. I understand the desire to spend draft capital for undervalued players that surprisingly dropped in the draft — but Holmes sees diamonds in the rough everywhere. As I wrote in my deep dive on the Lions two years ago: “Falling in love with players in the draft — and then trading up for them comes at a cost. Former general manager Matt Millen would do that a lot. The third-round picks Holmes is giving away could have added another wideout, a defensive end, a cornerback.” I then added last year: “Holmes did it again in last April’s draft by throwing in two third-round picks in the 2026 draft to get Jacksonville to swap third-round picks so he could snatch wide receiver Isaac TeSlaa from Arkansas. Holmes traded up to draft an injured Williams in the middle of the first round too. If the injuries hit this team this season and their depth is once again challenged, remember these moments.” While TeSlaa is expected start as their third wide receiver this season (albeit, their fifth or sixth target tight end Sam LaPorta and Gibbs out of the backfield), that two additional third round picks could present some answers in the secondary (or on the offensive line) this year — and it could have made a difference in making the playoffs last season given all their injuries on defense. Perhaps Holmes’ plan is to simply have his team avoid injuries this season. Good luck with that. At a certain point, the aggressiveness veers into arrogance, getting high on your supply of talent evaluation. And the arrogance quickly slips into recklessness. I do not think it is a coincidence that this slippery slope of aggressiveness-to-arrogance-to-recklessness also describes head coach Dan Campbell’s penchant to go for it on fourth down and to deploy fake punts. I strongly think his antics in the NFC Championship Game cost his team the opportunity to play in the Super Bowl three seasons ago. One of the jobs of a good head coach is to be a caretaker of the scoreboard for his team — especially when the talent on the team continues to improve. It’s one thing to be ultra-aggressive when leading a team that has double-digit losses in four straight seasons. It is quite another when the group that generated a 17-point lead in San Francisco against the 49ers is 30 minutes from reaching the Super Bowl. Campbell continues to fail in his caretaker responsibilities. For the second time in his head coaching career, he took over the play-calling duties midseason from his offensive coordinator. It was Anthony Lynn in 2021. It was John Morton last year. Well, who is the bum that hired these bums? One could call it his taking responsibility for things he didn’t like. On the other hand, there is a certain “look at me!” quality of taking over the play-calling that is similar to continuing to GO FOR IT on fourth downs. Or wearing “Grit” t-shirts, as he has been known to do. Similar to the teenage dudes wearing “Big Johnson” t-shirts on spring break, if you're wearing a t-shirt that says “Grit,” maybe you don’t have grit. Wearing a shirt that reads “Winner” does not make one a winner. But it does advertise that someone wants to be known as a winner. If the Winkelvosses were the inventors of Facebook, then they would have invented Facebook. Winners don’t wear shirts that read “Winner.” This may be a minor point, but it adds to the list. I have argued for years that Campbell’s schtick has a shelf life — and there will come a point when the team is not winning, when it will become tired. Or as the kids say: cringe. But we are not there yet. The flip side to all this is that the Lions ranked third in the NFL in DVOA using the advanced metrics by the Football Outsiders (now at FTN) — and it was only them and the Super Bowl-winning Seattle Seahawks that ranked in the top ten in Offensive DVOA, Defensive DVOA, and Special Team DVOA. They outscored their opponents by +3.9 net Points-Per-Game and outgained them by +41.3 net Yards-Per-Game last season. Losing five of their eight games decided by one scoring possession played a large role — but it is hard for me not to consider Campbell’s game management when considering this. They still have elite players. Goff, Gibbs, Sewell, wide receiver Amon-Ra St. Brown, defensive end Aidan Hutchinson — it would not be terribly surprising if this core led Detroit deep into the playoffs. Goff was spectacular last season — his 34 touchdown passes and 4564 passing yards were both the second most in the NFL. But if you are looking for canaries in the coal mine, here’s one: Goff ranked third in the NFL in Passing DVOA when not facing pressure — but he plummeted to 31st last season in that metric when encountering pass rush pressure. There are thunder clouds on the horizon from the salary cap crunch the franchise faces to pay all the guys struck Holmes with Cupid’s arrow. Hutchinson, Sewell, Joseph, linebacker Jack Campbell, and wide receiver Jameson Williams have already been paid on their big second contract. Gibbs, LaPorta, and Branch are looming — and then Goff’s contract explodes to over $60 million per year starting next year. The window is closing. Some more hidden gems drafted on Day Three would be nice to have around as value adds. The pressure is mounting … and pressure is known to burst pipes. GREEN BAY PACKERS: I thought the Packers were on the cusp of a Super Bowl run two years ago. I was impressed by the in-season improvements on both sides of the ball in a season that saw them humiliate the Dallas Cowboys in their building in the wildcard round of the NFL playoffs before losing by a narrow 24-21 score in San Francisco against the 49ers in the divisional round. But they stumbled down the stretch in the 2024-25 season by losing their final three games of the season, culminating in a 22-10 loss at Philadelphia in the wildcard round. In my deep dive on this team for last season, I concluded: “Maybe my positive vibes on Green Bay were a year premature and delayed by bad luck injuries to their quarterback. On the other hand, maybe this is a roster of very nice players that remains limited because it simply lacks the handful of superstar game-changers that are essential to win games in the postseason.” General manager Brian Gutekunst may have read that — as he made his big splash by adding a superstar when he pulled off the blockbuster trade with the Cowboys to acquire Micah Parsons. For a few weeks, Green Bay became the favorites to represent the NFC in the Super Bowl. But then they blew a double-digit lead in a loss at Cleveland before settling for a wild 40-40 tie in Dallas against a Cowboys team that was supposedly rebuilding after trading away Parsons. Something was off, whether it was overconfidence or some sort of lethargy. Then the injury bug hit that would take Parsons along with tight end Tucker Kraft (amidst a breakout season), starting right guard Zach Tom, and Jordan Love off the playing field. The Packers stumbled into the postseason on a four-game losing streak (all without Parsons). Yet in their third meeting with the Chicago Bears, they raced out to a 21-3 lead at halftime. However, the Bears scored 25 points in the fourth quarter and rallied from a double-digit deficit against Green Bay to pull out a 31-27 victory. With LaFleur’s future in doubt, new team President Ed Policy extended his contract. While Love was able to return to action for the wildcard round, Parsons, Kraft, and Tom remained sidelined. It’s easy to rationalize that their five-game losing streak would not have happened without those critical losses. Now healthy again, the Packers should be ready to make a deep playoff run now. Right? Not so fast; blowing three double-digit leads is a red flag that something is wrong. The roster was good enough to take those big leads, so why was the game not managed to keep them? Those disappointments lead to questions about the culture inside the building. It may be no coincidence that LaFleur is in the bottom six for NFL coaches in the NFLPA’s annual player survey. He received unfavorable marks regarding “respect for players” — and offensive coordinator Adam Stenavich fared even worse. Discovering this only added fuel to my fire that there are culture problems with this football team. Want more evidence about the culture decline of this program? A month after the assistant coach hiring cycle, special teams coordinator Rich Bisaccia abruptly retired from football, claiming he wanted to spend more time with his family in Florida. He later accepted the special teams coordinator job at Clemson, which is farther away than a morning commute. His assistant, Byron Storer, would have been in line to get promoted, but he decided to leave Green Bay to run the special teams for the Cleveland Browns. It’s all fishy, especially since one would think that Storer would find the Packers’ job more prestigious. Frankly, LaFleur looks burnt out. I noticed warning signs in my deep dive last year: “And after my raving about head coach Matt LaFleur in my deep dive last year (2024), after he oversaw significant improvements on both sides of the ball the previous season, he endured his worst season as a head coach in his six years, with game management issues compounded by too many lapses of unneeded emotional outbursts. Perhaps the pressure of expectations got to him? Perhaps that impacted the team?” Those thoughts look prescient now — and there are some hard realities for this team staring them in the face. Green Bay has lost five of their last six playoff games. They snuck into the postseason as the seventh seed in each of the last three years — meaning, they would not have even made the playoffs before the postseason field was expanded. I wondered about the lack of star power on the roster last year — perhaps the Packers’ commitment to the “green and growing” philosophy of relying mostly on developing draft picks has enabled them to get high on their own supply and overrate the quality of their roster? The offensive line appears to be regressing. They lost wide receivers Romeo Doubs and Dontayvion Wicks in free agency, with LaFleur making the bizarre comment that the previous depth at the position was a “problem.” Doubs was the only player in that wide receiver room who could win the ball on the outside. The defense is in transition after Jeff Haffley left to take the head coaching job for the Miami Dolphins. LaFleur brought in former Arizona Cardinals head coach Jonathan Gannon to run the defense — and his first decision was to make the transition from a 4-3 to a 3-4 scheme. The pass rush after Parsons, when he returns from injury, remains a question. The cornerback room has issues. Perhaps Gannon got too much of the credit operating the Philadelphia Eagles’ defense that reached the Super Bowl in 2023? He would not be the first coach that was made to look good by great cornerbacks and a deep defensive line rotation. His defenses in Arizona were failures that he was unable to scheme up. The Packers have had the youngest roster in the league for the three previous seasons. While they claimed the seventh seed in the NFC playoffs all three of those seasons, this perpetual motion machine may finally be about to break. Maybe the return of Parsons, Kraft, and Tom is all that is needed to take this team to the next level and win games in the postseason — but the cracks in the armor have been showing long before their late-season injuries. LOS ANGELES RAMS: In my deep dive on the Seattle Seahawks this summer, I speculated that the NFL was in a year of transition last season, with a changing of the guard regarding the recent serious contenders to win a Super Bowl. In hindsight, the Seahawks and the Rams were the clear cream of the crop last season. We won’t know how good they really were until we get a better appreciation of what really happened in the league last year. Using the DVOA metrics by the Football Outsiders (now at FTN), they rank the 2025-26 Seahawks as the fourth-best team of all time since 1977. It sure does not feel like we were watching a historic team like that at the time. Surprisingly, Los Angeles ranked 21st in that all-time DVOA ranking list since 1977. The statistical dominance of both squads may simply speak to just how mediocre the rest of the league was last season. The Rams' offseason moves certainly indicate they are in a “win-now” mode — well, most of their moves, at least (I will get into the decision to draft a project quarterback in the first round of the NFL draft shortly). General manager Les Snead sacrificed draft capital and a good pass rusher in Jared Verse to make the big splash to acquire Myles Garrett, who is five years older than Verse. Snead also maneuvered via trade and free agency to acquire the outstanding Kansas City Chiefs’ cornerback duo, Trent McDuffie and Jaylen Watson. All these flashy moves were enough to convince defensive tackle Aaron Donald to come out of retirement for one more Super Bowl run. On paper, adding those pieces to an already talented unit that ranked 10th in the league by allowing 20.4 Points-Per-Game seems incredible. But let’s remember that, in practice, these super teams don’t always work out as planned. Of course, the moves make sense (and who would turn down given Donald around bite at the apple?). Los Angeles only managed one sack in their three playoff games. Adding Garrett and his NFL record-breaking 23 sacks and Donald’s dominant presence in the middle that seemingly demands double teams to a unit that already has Byron Young (12 sacks last season), Braden Fiske, and Kobie Turner seems mouth-watering. And if they can generate consistent pressure on the quarterback with five-man rushes (the offense can’t double-team everyone!), their pass coverage should be even better — even before the upgrades at cornerback. The Rams surrendered 216.7 passing Yards-Per-Game last season, ranking 19th in the NFL. But the LA defense had other vulnerabilities last year, including slowing down outside zone runs — and offenses can deploy that tactic to avoid Donald when he is on the field. But both Garrett and Watson bring elite run-stoppage skills. The biggest weakness that Los Angeles suffered last season was with their special teams — this deficiency versus Seattle’s outstanding special unit probably cost them the Super Bowl. Special teams play is pretty fluid from year to year — but simply banking on regression to the mean is not a great plan. We’ll see. This leads us to the other side of the ball where head coach and anointed offensive genius Sean McVay finally discovered that it’s not 11 personnel (one running back and three wide receivers) that can trigger mismatches on the field. When injuries forced McVay to play 13 personnel (one running back and three tight ends) because of the lack of wide receiver bodies, he discovered what anyone who watches Jim Harbaugh’s offenses has known: extra tight ends on the field create enticing mismatches in both the run and passing games. McVay became a kid in the candy store when he realized using tight ends in motion could really expose and disrupt opposing defenses. In the end, the Rams’ 331 snaps in 13 personnel were more than double the next most usage of three tight ends in the league. The implications of 13 personnel have been one of the hottest talking points in the offseason. McVay could be too clever by half if he uses his new toy so much that it keeps Davante Adams or even Puka Nucua off the field. In the second half of the regular season, tight end Davis Allen was almost on the field as much as those star wide receivers were (and Allen did log in more snaps than both Nucua and Adams in the game against Detroit). For the record, McVay’s usage of 13 personnel did dip in the postseason. And the league has had an entire offseason to adjust. Trends in the NFL are cyclical. The Vic Fangio defenses of two high safeties and more nickel pass coverages as the base defense are designed to slow down prolific passing attacks. Getting bigger bodies on the field helps the offense run the ball — and if these bigger bodies are also skilled in catching, given the increased reliance on tight ends in the passing game in college, then watch out! But the defensive response is to get bigger themselves. It’s important to note that the Seahawks and Baltimore Ravens have been ahead of the curve in this regard the last few seasons by acquiring players who are skilled against both the pass and the run. Seattle plays a 4-2-5 base formation without sacrificing anything when it comes to slowing down the run. We’ll see how this plays out (I suspect McVay will cut the baby in half by using 12 personnel with two tight ends on the field with both his star receivers), but I will say that these so-called offensive geniuses can think they are too smart for their own good at times. And this brings us to the selection of Alabama quarterback Ty Simpson. We understand Snead and McVay’s logic: Matthew Stafford is in the twilight of his career — but we can balance winning now with laying the foundation for our future! This is reminiscent of the Atlanta Falcons logic of spending $100 million of guaranteed money on Kirk Cousins while also drafting Michael Penix in the first round. As the Falcons’ experience demonstrated, the fundamental flaw in this logic is that you cannot play both valuable resources at the same time. So while Snead/McVay can rationalize by claiming “losing draft capital in the Garrett trade made using the first round pick now on the franchise QB smart.” Yeah … except for the fact that the first-round pick could have been used on another offensive lineman (there is never enough) or another shiny tight end (imagine Oregon’s Kenyon Sadiq with his 6’3 frame and 4.39/40 speed look in McVay’s offense)? If the goal is to win a Super Bowl now, then go all-in! But, see, Snead and McVay are smarter than the rest of us. They are going to win a Super Bowl now and develop their next Super Bowl-winning quarterback. Never mind who is going to be on this roster to support Simpson for that 2028-29 Super Bowl run. And never mind Simpson’s erratic play in big games at Alabama. Those are just problems waiting to be solved by the two smartest guys in the room. If the Los Angeles Rams go on to win the Super Bowl, I’m not going to be surprised. They were clearly the second-best team in the league last year; they improved significantly, and they might have been the 21st-best NFL team in the last three decades! But if they fail to achieve this objective, I suspect it will be for these reasons. And let’s remember that Stafford is now 38 years old. He won the MVP last year — but his decline in the postseason. Granted, playing in the cold weather in Chicago did not help his stat line, nor did playing the Seahawks defense. But if Stafford begins to decline, does this house of cards collapse on itself — especially given the sky-high expectations that come with adding Garrett and Donald? NEW YORK GIANTS: After winning only seven games the last two seasons, the Giants hit the Available Head Coach Lottery in the offseason when the Ravens and John Harbaugh parted ways. In 18 mostly successful seasons in Baltimore, Harbaugh’s teams posted a 180-113 (.614) record with 12 playoff appearances and a Super Bowl victory. But those pundits expecting an immediate turnaround are probably going to be disappointed. Harbaugh’s biggest immediate challenge is changing the culture of this football team — from entrenched cronies in the office rooms to too many “me-first” attitudes in the locker room who are only too happy to leak their latest football opinion to the ever-eager New York media. Previous head coach Brian Daboll did not help matters with his frequent temper tantrums on the sidelines — Harbaugh’s steadying leadership will be a breath of fresh air. The bad culture stuff probably leaked onto the field. The Giants had an 8-4-1 record in one-possession games in Daboll’s first season. Since then, they have lost 19 of their 25 games decided by eight points or less, including losing 15 of those 17 games in the last two seasons. New York is better than their 4-13 record last season — and they only got outgained by -26.0 Yards-Per-Game last season, which is the mark of a team with a 7-10 record. But while the roster has some nice high-end talent, depth is a significant problem after years of bad drafting by general manager Joe Schoen. One of the smartest things Harbaugh did — and it was the last sticking point before he signed the contract — was to gain full control of player personnel over Schoen. That extended negotiation lasted days, which may have cost Harbaugh bringing offensive coordinator Todd Monken over with him from the Ravens as Monken was then offered the head coaching gig with Cleveland. I don’t love Kansas City offensive coordinator and former Chicago Bears head coach Matt Nagy as the second choice. Second-year quarterback Jaxson Dart has potential after a solid rookie season. Harbaugh will rein in his tendency to be too reckless when running with the football. But Dart is far from a finished product. He needs to improve his decision-making as a passer and a runner. His comfort operating under center is a work in progress. His completion percentage of 63.7% was -0.2% below the league's expected completion percentage for the throws he made. He ranked 32nd of the 36 qualifying quarterbacks with at least 160 attempts with a 32% completion percentage of his passes of at least 20 air yards. Furthermore, wide receiver Malik Nabers' recovery from his torn ACL in late September has been slow — he might not be ready for the start of the season, which begs the question regarding just how effective he will be this year. New York ranked fifth in the NFL by generating 129.1 rushing Yards-Per-Game — but that mark drops to 93.3 rushing YPG when taking away rushing yards from the quarterback, leaving questions about the quality of the running back room. The offensive line is promising — although it remains to be seen if it can execute the vision of smash-mouth football. Signing Ravens’ fullback Patrick Ricard was smart. Four of the five expected starters have been together the previous two seasons — and either first-round draft pick Francis Mauigoa or free agent signing from Baltimore Daniel Faalele should take the right guard spot that is still in question. The defense is the bigger rebuild assignment after the Giants gave up 359.5 total YPG, ranking 28th in the NFL. This unit has not finished better than 27th in stopping the run in four straight seasons after they gave up 145.3 rushing YPG last year, ranking second-to-last in the league. Trading away run-stuffer Dexter Lawrence II to Cincinnati will not help that cause — but he was demanding a trade after negotiations for his next contract were not progressing. Don’t be surprised if other veterans are dealt before the season is over as part of Harbaugh’s needed reset on the culture. New York has lost at least 10 games in 10 of the last 12 seasons. It is going to take Harbaugh to professionalize this outfit. SAN FRANCISCO 49ERS: It sure looks like it’s Last Chance Saloon for the 49ers before a rebuild is inevitable — but that is exactly what I wrote in last year’s deep dive on this team. But my macro assessment of the 2025-26 NFL season was that it was a season of transition where the conventional powers of the past few seasons — Kansas City, Buffalo, Baltimore, Philadelphia, the LA Rams — passed the torch to a new crop of Super Bowl contenders. Seattle and New England may have been one year ahead of schedule — but somebody had to win last year’s Super Bowl (and the Patriots certainly were not ready). In hindsight, San Francisco may have blown a golden opportunity to finally win a Super Bowl with Kyle Shanahan as their head coach. Instead, after officially dethroning the reeling Eagles of their Super Bowl reign by a 23-19 score in the NFC wild card round of the playoffs last year, they got exposed in a brutal 41-6 loss on the road against the Seahawks in the divisional round the next week. Of course, injuries played a role in that loss — but that excuse is almost always there for Shanahan and general manager John Lynch. Defensive end Nick Bosa played only three games before his season-ending ACL injury. Linebacker Fred Warner suffered a season-ending ankle fracture in early October. Defensive end Mykel Williams’ season ended in Week Nine with his ACL injury. In one respect, it was surprising to see the 49ers finish with a 13-6 record. Last season could be viewed as proof of concept regarding the plan and vision of the Shanahan/Lynch partnership. On the other hand, there is solid evidence that last year’s results were more of a lucky aberration that finally skidded to a halt when playing Seattle. The 49ers had a 6-1 record in games decided by one-scoring possession. They outgained their opponents by just +11.2 net Yards-Per-Game. Only seven starters are left from the team that lost to the Chiefs in the 2024 Super Bowl. I have given Lynch the benefit of the doubt for years — and I use him as one of the rare exceptions of my belief that guys getting head coaching or general manager gigs rarely work out. But he deserves scrutiny. He hit a grand slam home run by selecting Brock Purdy with the final pick in the 2022 draft — but is his reputation living off the vapors of that find? His batting average in the draft since then has not been great. The rest of that 2022 draft bottomed out. The only player still around from the 2023 draft is strong safety Ji’Ayir Brown, who got benched last season. Wide receiver Ricky Pearsall, Lynch’s first-round draft pick in 2024, is on the hot seat after two injury-riddled seasons — he did not score a touchdown last season and only has 928 receiving yards in his career. Cornerback Renardo Green, Lynch’s second-round pick in 2024, is also on the hot seat with just one career interception. The report card for defensive linemen Alfred Collins and Williams, Lynch’s first- and second-round draft picks last season, remains incomplete due to injuries. Right guard Dominick Puni, a third-round pick two years ago, has developed into a solid starter — but he may be the only saving grace for Lynch since snagging Purdy. When I see draft failures like this, I get curious and execute the “Caserio Test”, named after Houston Texans’ general manager Nick Caserio, whose only selection in the NFL draft not coming from a Power Five/Four conference program was a kid from Notre Dame in his six seasons and 49 rookie selections. Shanahan’s track record is not quite to that level of some toxic mix of laziness/arrogance/dogmatism, but it’s pretty bad. After Shanahan drafted five of nine players who were not from Power Five conferences in the Purdy 2022 draft, 31 of his next 35 draft picks through last April have been players from Power Five/Four Conference teams. While I understand the appeal of power conference players (as does every GM in the league), maybe the Niners would be better off today if Lynch were finding diamonds in the rough from Group of Five/Six programs? The draft results are not good — and there are certainly red flags on the 2026 draft class. Second-round draft pick De’Zhaun Stribling has speed at defensive end yet was considered a reach as the 33rd player selected in the draft. Third round pick Romello Height is coming off two shoulder surgeries and already 25 years old — and he is undersized at 239 pounds at defensive end. Lynch’s other third-round pick, Indiana running back Kaelon Black, lacks speed and caught only eight balls out of the backfield in two seasons with the Hoosiers. And then there is the Brandon Aiyuk standoff, which may simply be a distraction at this point. Shanahan was active in free agency — but he brought in a group either with an injury history or the reputation of a misfit toy. Wide receiver Christian Kirk is on his fourth team in six seasons. Cornerback Jack Jones is on his fourth team in four years. Center Brett Toth is a career journeyman after playing in Philadelphia last year. Left guard Robert Jones comes off a neck injury last season. Linebacker Dre Greenlaw returns after his one-year hiatus in Denver in an injury-riddled season. Say it with me: “This Year Will Be Different!” Maybe Lynch looks good because Shanahan makes him look good — oh, and Purdy might have been a Shanahan pick anyway! Of course, Shanahan’s stock is not pristine. A good argument can be made that he has blown three Super Bowls because of his play-calling — two with the 49ers and one when he was the offensive coordinator for the Atlanta Falcons when they were blowing a 28-3 late third quarter lead. This turns the subject to Christian McCaffrey, who led the NFL with 413 touches from 311 carries and another 102 receptions. Second-year running back Isaac Guerendo got zero carries last season after running for 420 yards and 5.0 Yards-Per-Carry as a rookie. Rookie running back Jordan James got his first NFL carry in the blowout playoff loss against the Seahawks. Shanahan is burning the tires off the now 30-year-old McCaffrey, who was on the field for 83% of the snaps on offense. Is it Shanahan’s fault for not using two recent draft picks to spell him some time — or is it indicative of Shanahan’s draft day judgment? CMC generated only 3.9 Yards-Per-Carry, so it was not like he was simply too productive to keep off the field for the supposed play-calling guru. And yet because Shanahan has such a great reputation in the league, his coaching staff was once again raided by other clubs in the offseason. This year, Shanahan lost defensive coordinator Robert Saleh, who took the head coaching job for the Tennessee Titans and took assistant head coach and defensive specialist Gus Bradley with him. Defensive passing game coordinator Daniel Bullocks left to coach the cornerbacks for the Green Bay Packers. Tight ends coach and offensive run game coordinator Brian Fleury left to become the offensive coordinator for Seattle. Continual brain drain at the coaching level eventually spells trouble. The roster is aging. Signing wide receiver Mike Evans looks nice on paper, but he is 33 years old. Tight end George Kittle turns 34 in October. Lynch signed 38-year-old left tackle Trent Williams to a new two-year deal in the offseason. Warner and Greenlaw are 29 while Bosa is 28. How many years do those injured bodies have left? The retirement of defensive end Bryce Huff at 27 years old came as a surprise. In last year’s deep dive, I made the comparison that Purdy is the Ringo Starr of quarterbacks — initially underappreciated before being universally revered by drummers in the music community. But Purdy is being asked to be Paul McCartney or John Lennon (take your pick, I’m a Stones or Kinks guy). I think the power hierarchy in the NFL is still in transition, with the supposed new guard not firmly established and the old order maybe having one or two last runs in them. Maybe the veterans on both sides of the ball can stay healthy and pull off one final run of excellence in a league where I simply do not find anyone dominant. But if the window has closed on this generation of San Francisco stars, the writing has been on the wall for quite a while. To compound matters, Shanahan’s car accident in mid-July should not be underestimated. His missing of training camp robbed the team of his daily presence, his leadership, and his attention to detail on both sides of the ball.SEATTLE SEAHAWKS: To understand the 2025-26 Super Bowl champions is to understand how history will eventually evaluate that NFL season. I have my suspicions that hindsight will eventually lead to the conventional wisdom being that it was a down year in what was a season of transition regarding the powers of the contenders for the Super Bowl title. Kansas City and Baltimore failed to make the playoffs — and Buffalo squandered their golden opportunity to finally reach the Super Bowl in the Josh Allen era. On the NFC side, both Philadelphia and Detroit took steps backwards. San Francisco was ravaged by injuries. The Seahawks demolished them in the Divisional Round of the NFC playoffs by a 41-6 score. And then there stood the Los Angeles Rams. Admittedly, I was on the Rams in that game, but Seattle beat them by a 31-27 score to reach the Super Bowl. The Seahawks won two of their three meetings with Sean McVay and Matthew Stafford by a combined three points, with all three of those games decided by four points or less. Frankly, the winning difference between those two teams may have been Seattle’s outstanding special teams unit significantly outplaying a subpar Rams special teams. We were on the Seahawks in the Super Bowl against New England (our NFL Game of the Year) in a game we correctly identified as a mismatch. Looking back, Seattle and the LA Rams were the best two in the NFL last year — and probably the divide between them and the rest of the league was wider than we realized at the time. Using the DVOA metrics by the Football Outsiders (now at FTN), they rank the 2025-26 Seahawks as the fourth-best team of all time since 1977. It sure does not feel like we were watching a historic team like that at the time. Their statistical dominance may speak to just how mediocre the rest of the league was last season. I have several theories about this, including the rise of reckless decision-making by “offensive” head coaches and the lack of development of offensive line play in college for the expectations in the NFL, making all 32 teams vulnerable to injuries at that position. We will learn a lot more about the 2025-26 NFL season as the 2026-27 season progresses. In the meantime, we are left to make some cold but real assessments. The Mike Macdonald defense was spectacular last season, with “amoeba” players like Devon Witherspoon and Nick Emmanwori having the flexibility to thrive in pass coverage or move into the box to stop the run — and this allowed the Seattle defense to play in a 4-2-5 nickel formation as their base defense 93% of the time. Macdonald’s fundamental philosophy is to have his unit make formation adjustments post-snap. Having players who can operate effectively at multiple positions is essential. But the margins are thin — and the defensive line is aging, with 34-year-olds DeMarcus Lawrence and Jarran Reed along with the 32-year-old Leonard Williams, three of the four starters up front. That group helped the Seahawks rank third in the NFL by surrendering only 91.9 rushing Yards-Per-Game — and they gave up -155 fewer rushing yards than their expected Rushing Yards Allowed metrics, despite rarely playing a stacked box. If the play of those veterans begins to decline — requiring Macdonald (who calls the defensive plays) to dial up more blitzes or more defenders in the box to stop the run, then the secret sauce for this defense may go away. On the other side of the ball, the dirty little secret about Seattle was that they got exposed in Week 11 in their initial showdown against the Rams, as they did not take the bait regarding defensive expectations regarding the heavy personnel and multiple tight end looks that their offense was deploying, but instead schemed their defense based on tendencies. Quarterback Sam Darnold’s effectiveness waned significantly in that contest — and the copycat league quickly mimicked those tactics. After the offense ranked 10th in Offensive DVOA through Week 10, they ranked 18th in that metric for the rest of the regular season. Even worse, while Darnold was leading the NFL in Passing DVOA through the first ten weeks, he dropped to 18th for the rest of the regular season. Darnold’s struggles against pressure were also a significant issue. In his 333 passes in a clean pocket in the regular season, he threw for 3119 yards with 15 touchdowns, six interceptions, and a Passer Rating of 110.7. But in his 144 passes under pressure in the regular season, he had only 929 yards, 10 touchdowns, eight interceptions, and a Passer Rating of 72.4. Darnold was responsible for 20 turnovers via 14 interceptions and six lost fumbles last season — but he did play mistake-free football against the Rams and Patriots en route to the Super Bowl title. It does not have to be all-or-nothing regarding Darnold, as our 24/7 Hot Take Sports Industrial Complex suggests. If you give Darnold time, he has more than enough talent to torch opposing defenses. But he can get a bit frenetic if pressured in the pocket. He can force things and try to do too much. It happens to most quarterbacks. It’s not a death sentence — and I have criticized Stafford over his mistakes over the years. In the Super Bowl win, Darnold completed only 19 of 38 passes for 200 yards — but he took only one sack and did not commit a turnover. Quarterbacks on losing teams in the Super Bowl would get ripped for that stat line — all I am saying is let’s not anoint him, despite leading his team to victory. With the confidence and validation from the Super Bowl triumph, Darnold and this entire team may perform better this season. But the rest of the league may quickly catch up with their level of competence this year. And given the age of their defensive line and the fact that Darnold is probably not a top-ten quarterback, vulnerabilities exist in their attempt to accomplish the rare repeat as Super Bowl champions.TAMPA BAY BUCCANEERS: In my deep dive on this team last season, I concluded that they were a legitimate sleeper to make a run to the Super Bowl. After their 6-2 start with quarterback Baker Mayfield an early MVP candidate, I thought my evaluation was being validated. But then the Buccaneers lost seven of their final nine games and missed the playoffs altogether with an 8-9 record. What happened? In hindsight, I think it was a death by a thousand cuts. For starters, they were ravaged by injuries. Linebacker Lavonte David later conceded that Mayfield was playing with an oblique injury, a shoulder injury, an ankle injury, and a knee injury while describing them all as “injuries you didn’t expect a quarterback to play through.” I was very bullish on their offensive line — but injuries disrupted their continuity from 2024-25, with the starting five combining to miss 32 games to injury. Running back Bucky Irving missed seven games to injury and was not back to full health when he returned to the field. Wide receivers Mike Evans and Chris Godwin missed eight and nine games, respectively. On defense, defensive tackle Caljah Kancey only played three games before a season-ending torn pec injury. Rookie cornerback Benjamin Morrison missed seven games due to an injury. To compound the injuries, their attempt to jumpstart their pass rush by signing Hassan Reddick in free agency failed, as he was mostly missing in action. This was all too much to overcome by the end of the regular season. However, it would be a misjudgment to simply conclude that the attrition was the only fundamental problem. The toll finally came due on the annual revolving door at offensive coordinator. The promotion of passing game coordinator Josh Grizzard did not work. He had never called plays before, was too predictable, and struggled to draw things up on third down. Grizzard has been replaced by Zac Robinson, who was the offensive coordinator for the Atlanta Falcons the last two seasons. He becomes Mayfield’s ninth offensive coordinator in nine seasons, but at least he endorsed the choice. Robinson comes from the Sean McVay coaching tree, of course. The Falcons did not put up great numbers under his guidance, but it needs to be considered that those offenses were held back by their quarterback play. But the bigger concern may be the state of the defense. I like Todd Bowles — but I need to apply the same scrutiny to head coaches who are pulling double duty as the defensive coordinator and calling plays on game day as I do offensive head coaches who insist on calling the plays on offense. The defensive backfield struggled in defending the flats — and Tampa Bay ranked 27th in the league by surrendering 238.2 passing Yards-Per-Game. They were last in Red Zone defense. Bowles' aggressive blitz schemes failed. The Bucs were one of just seven teams with a Pressure Rate below 20% of other opponents’ dropbacks — and they ranked 18th in the league in Adjusted Sack Rate. Too often, the defense failed the team in clutch moments. The tackling fundamentals were off. Bowles responded to these problems by overhauling the defensive coaching staff — but it is only fair to ask if the game has passed the 62-year-old by. In the last three seasons, they have ranked 27th (last year), 29th, and 29th in Passing YPG Allowed — and they have ranked 25th, 15th, and 26th in Passing Yards Per Attempt Allowed. Additionally, they have ranked 24th in the NFL in Opponent Expected Points Added per Dropback and 27th in Passing Success Rate Allowed over the last three seasons. At a certain point, the fundamental problem may be the schematic vision from the guy up top. Bowles was the defensive coordinator when this franchise won the Super Bowl in 2022. But this issue deserves consideration — and he may simply have too much on his plate. Since that Super Bowl triumph, Tampa Bay has a 35-33 record in Bowles’ four seasons — and they are just 28-26 since signing Mayfield in free agency after Tom Brady retired. They have won only one playoff game in four postseason games under Bowles. But Mayfield, Irving, and the offensive line are all back and healthy again. Evans signed as a free agent with San Francisco — but second-year wide receiver Emeka Agbuka looks ready to become the number one target in the passing attack. The defense moves on David, who retired after 15 seasons — and cornerback Jamel Dean was lost in free agency. But Detroit linebacker Alex Anzalone was signed in free agency to replace David, and the hope is that Morrison is ready to replace Dean as the second starting cornerback. General manager Jason Licht addressed the perpetual pass rush concerns by adding two intriguing players. Miami pass rush extraordinaire fell to them at the 15th spot in the first round in the NFL draft due to concerns about his short arms, a problem that did not slow down his motor and agile moves in wreaking havoc on the quarterback in the Hurricanes' run to the national championship game. Linebacker Al-Quadin Muhammad was signed in free agency from the Lions after registering 11 sacks and 20 quarterback hits despite playing only part-time. It's still possible that my bullish sentiments about the core of this squad were off by one year — and this is the season they make a deep playoff run in an NFC that I consider still in transition.WASHINGTON COMMANDERS: After reaching the NFC Championship Game in January of 2025, there were plenty of reasons to expect this team to take a step back last season. General manager Adam Peters was very aggressive in bringing in veterans who could potentially take them to the next level. I had some cautious optimism that the Commanders could make another deep run in the playoffs — but I concluded my deep dive by suggesting: “The margin of error has gotten thin.” That statement proved prescient as injuries devastated this team. Washington lost 222 combined games to injury last season — and they suffered the second most Total Points Lost to Injury according to the metrics by Sports Info Solutions. These injuries then exposed the lack of depth on the roster constructed by Peters. The Commanders had the oldest roster in the NFL last season, with an average age of 28.2 per player. What became particularly glaring was that the bench pieces were often made up of older players — so this team really didn’t benefit from getting to try out and give experience to younger players on the roster in a lost 5-12 campaign. Washington only had five draft picks last year after the aggressive trading of picks to grab “win now” veterans. This is a franchise that has none of their first round draft picks from 2019 through 2023 still on their roster — and the developmental pipeline has been overlooked. Now Peters and head coach Dan Quinn are both on hot seats, although Peters may be given enough rope to hire one more head coach if expectations are not met this season. Maybe. It’s another year of urgency — and perhaps the immediate success Quinn enjoyed in his first season as the head coach with rookie quarterback Jayden Daniels under center led to some shortsighted decisions last year. It would not be the first time that a brain trust overplayed their hand. Unfortunately, it is difficult to make confident assessments regarding the roster that returns since the barrage of injuries on both sides of the ball was so prevalent. Daniels suffered three different injuries last season that had him miss Games Three and Four, Game Eight, Games 10-13, and Games 15-17 — so not only did the injuries mount that he was playing through, but there was never a legitimate opportunity to re-establish some continuity. But this also begs a question I asked in my deep dive for this team last year: “Can Daniels develop into a dangerous passer when forced out of the pocket like (Lamar) Jackson has become — or will he continue to rely on his legs? Daniels had a below-average turnover rate last season, especially when throwing over the middle. And I still worry about his thin 6’4 frame with his 210-lb body absorbing more and more blows.” Those questions remain with lingering concerns that Daniels may simply end up being the second coming of Robert Griffin III for this franchise. The team did get younger in the offseason, but that was almost by definition — and it came at the expense of lots of roster turnover. Quinn also made many changes with the coaching staff. After taking over the play-calling duties on defense after Week 11, Quinn let defensive coordinator Joe Whitt go and replaced him with Brian Flores protege Daronte Jones. Perhaps he will offer a shot in the arm for this defense that ranked last in the league by allowing 384.4 total Yards-Per-Game and second-to-last in Opponent Expected Points Added per Play Allowed. But Quinn’s philosophy differs from Flores’ aggressive blitzing approach, with Jones serving as passing game coordinator last season. On offense, Kliff Kingsbury “mutually parted ways” as offensive coordinator in the offseason — and Quinn promoted David Blough as his replacement. Considered a rising star in the offensive coaching ranks, the former NFL quarterback will likely bring a schematic approach similar to Ben Johnson, for which he was an assistant with the Detroit Lions. But Blough spent most of last year as the assistant quarterbacks coach before getting promoted to quarterbacks coach in December when Tavita Prichard left the team to become the offensive coordinator at Stanford. Blough has never called the offensive plays at any level — and he was an assistant to an assistant until late last season. Jones has not called defensive plays before now either. This is very high risk for Quinn — and if this season bottoms out, the writing was on the wall. It is difficult not to conclude that Quinn was reluctant to hire more experienced coordinators due to the risk that he might be bringing on his midseason replacement. Perhaps Daniels regains his rookie form and a reliable second target in the passing game emerges to complement Terry McLaurin. The offensive line has promise if second-year right tackle John Conerly Jr. can continue his second-half improvement from last year to give the team high-quality bookend tackles along with Laremy Tunsil on the left side. First round draft pick Sonny Styles should thrive immediately at middle linebacker — and perhaps the potential six new starters brought in through free agency come together quickly. But the margins for success remain very, very thin.Best of luck — Frank.
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